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National Identity: Banal, Personal, and Embedded   
[word count: 8,956]   
Forthcoming in Nations and Nationalism 13(4), July 2007. 
Introduction 
 
  In September 2001 two British banks, the Bank of Scotland (BoS) and the Halifax, 
merged to form the banking group HBOS.  In one respect this shows the play of 
capitalist rationalities in the increasingly competitive environment of financial 
services (Leyshon and Thrift 1997).  But it was also an encounter negotiated between 
two nationally defined organisations, albeit with significant differences.  BoS, 
founded in 1695, had become one of the two dominant banks in Scotland in the latter 
twentieth century, and an important pillar of the Scottish economy and civil society 
(Saville 1996).  Being Scottish was integral to the organisation's identity.  The Halifax 
was a building society (est. 1852) that expanded into banking after 1987 and became a 
plc in 1997.    Although identified with its regional base in north-eastern England, this 
company's identity primarily drew on its rapid growth and strong position in the UK 
mortgage market, not on its 'Englishness'.  The Halifax brought almost twice as much 
staff and market value to the merger as BoS, as well as the Chief Executive and 
several other key executive staff.  Thus while a merger and not a take-over, the 
Halifax was the dominant partner in the new organisation.  As with any merger, staff 
had to cope with the stresses of organisational change and disruption.  Not 
surprisingly, tensions over power relations between the two merging banks and 
between their respective staffs were sometimes articulated through notions of national 
differences between the Scots and the English, especially by the Scottish staff of BoS 
for the whom the experience was more clearly nationally framed. 
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  Before this merger was envisioned, I had arranged to do a year of ethnographic 
research at BoS.  The aim was to better understand how national identity is realised in 
daily life, and how large organisations frame and shape the ways that national identity 
is construed.  Although it altered the research context, the merger was fortuitous for 
the Scottish-English encounter it entailed, rendering some of the research themes 
more explicit.  While still based within the BoS part of HBOS, I did research among 
staff from both banks, which involved participant observation in the areas of HR and 
staff training, and on staff training courses, augmented by interviews, email 
questionnaires, and archival researchi.  The larger context of the study, which was part 
of a multi-study research programme, involved questions about whether recent 
political devolution was significantly affecting national identities in the UKii.  In this 
case there is a complex contrary motion, as organisations aggregate to maintain power 
in the field of capitalist competition, while political institutions devolve regionally in 
an effort to sustain legitimacy. 
  This research addresses a basic theoretical problem once posed by Katherine 
Verdery: 'How do people become national?' (1996:229).  More specifically, how do 
we understand the relationship between national identities as social categories that 
people use to divide up and make sense of the social world, and as an aspect of self-
identity, partially constitutive of personhood.  In fact this is a particular variant of a 
core problem in the study of identity more generally (Brubaker and Cooper 2001:7; 
Elliott 2001:9): the relationship between social and personal identities.  How do broad 
and rather abstract social categories become salient for, and woven into, the 
individual's sense of self?  Although this conceptual question is widely recognised, it 
is more easily stated than grappled with, for at least a couple of reasons. 
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  First, there is a strong and understandable bias in social research toward the analysis 
of systems of symbolic representation that we can access, and away from more remote 
mental processes.  Regardless of whether one considers national identities to be 
deeply rooted in integral aspects of the psyche (Connor 1993; Grosby 2001; Smith 
1991), or as more superficial ideological overlays (Ozkirimli 2003; Tishkov 2000), 
when it comes to actually studying nationalisms and national identities, it is publicly 
accessible discourses and their social distributions that we normally turn our attention 
to.  Whether by notions of  'mythomoteurs' (Armstrong 1982), 'invented traditions' 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), 'stories of peoplehood' (Smith 2003), or some other 
formulation, it is easier to analyse the structural forms of the discursive categories, 
than it is to grasp how these become personally significant. 
  Even in the field of social psychology, 'self-categorisation theory' lays its emphasis 
on how social identity categories are constituted so as to channel individuals into 
collectivities.  The social category tends to trump the self as an object of analysis (see 
Reicher and Hopkins 2001:37-52).  Arising out of this field, and particularly relevant 
to this study is the work of Michael Billig and his influential conception of  'banal 
nationalism' (1995), which has helped stimulate a trend in nationalism studies toward 
examining the implicit, everyday, and sometimes micro-level creation and recreation 
of national identity (e.g. Azaryahu and Kook 2002; Bryant 2006; Cormack 2005; 
Cusak 2005; Fox 2006; Gill 2005; Jean-Klein 2001; Palmer 1998; Stapleton and 
Wilson 2004).  There is a sense in much of this work that by focussing our attention at 
this mundane level we are getting closer to the springs of personal identity.  But this is 
perhaps misleading, in that Billig's argument is really concerned more with the 
implicit and naturalised social reproduction of social categories, than with how we 
invest ourselves in them.  This is a point I will elaborate below. 
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  Secondly, in addition to the practical hurdles of studying processes of selfhood, there 
is also theoretically principled resistance to doing so.  Richard Jenkins argues that we 
should be careful about reifying a distinction between internal and external realities, 
between the self and society, proposing that we should instead see these as two sides 
of a single dialectical process (2004:15-26).   He is suspicious of those who would 
argue for 'the primacy of the self' (e.g. Cohen 1994; Craib 1998) and the need to 
grapple with its essentially inward and private nature.  For Jenkins such searches for 
the inaccessible should be avoided, and attention restricted to that part of the self that 
can be discerned in social interactions. 
  Anthony Cohen is one of the few scholars who have taken Verdery's question head 
on by positing a conception of 'personal nationalism' (1996, 2000), arguing that far 
from simply being caught up in and subjugated by nationalist discourses, individuals 
appropriate these discourses in active processes of self-making with deep personal 
significance.  Unsurprisingly Jenkins objects to this approach, suggesting that 'Cohen 
is led into metaphysical assertion rather than defensible argument' (2004:31).  
Nonetheless Cohen's efforts, at the very least, help to explicate the difficulties 
encountered in trying to answer Verdery's question, so I will examine them more 
closely below.    
  What is most problematic in these discussions of (national) identity is precisely the 
reduction of the matter to a conceptual opposition between personal and social 
identities, and relative lack of attention to the role of intervening structures and 
contexts through which these interact.  I find the recent work of Derek Layder 
conceptually helpful in this regard (2004a; 2004b; 2006:271-301).   Responding to the 
various dualisms--individual/society, micro/macro, structure/agency--that both enable 
and constrain social theory, Layder proposes a model of embedded domains of 
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analysis, working outward from the individual.  I will explore the utility of this 
formulation below. 
  The body of this article examines the question of how people 'do' national identity in 
regard to the case study of the bank merger, comparing the respective lenses of 
Billig's 'banal nationalism', Cohen's 'personal nationalism', and Layder's socially 
embedded model of selfhood.  Each brings out different and interesting aspects of the 
data, but I want to argue that it is Layder's model that takes us furthest toward 
answering the question of how personal identities become invested in social identities, 
national or otherwise. 
 
Banal Nationalism 
 
  Billig's thesis of 'banal nationalism' has struck a chord for many academics trying to 
understand the subtle insinuation of nationhood into daily life.  As he put it: 
 
the term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits 
which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced.  It is 
argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some 
observers have supposed.  Daily, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged' in the 
lives of its citizenry.  Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in 
established nations, is the endemic condition (1995:6; bold in original) 
 
  There are several different aspects to Billig's concept that can be picked up on here.  
The one that has probably had the widest resonance is the idea that nationalism is 
crucially sustained not so much through explicit ideological exhortation, but through 
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implicit, repetitive, symbolic reinforcement.  Nationalism abides in the little things, 
jokes, advertisements, street names, weather reports, and so on, which assume the 
presence of nations.  Billig's insight here has inspired many researches across 
different disciplines to examine various domains, discourses and practices in and 
through which people are habituated to nationalism. 
  But other aspects of Billig's argument are often left aside.  One is that the reason for 
being interested in nationalism's 'cooler', more banal forms is not to normalise 
nationalism, but rather to understand the efficacy its more explicit, and 'hot' forms.  
Ultimately Billig's argument is not that banality reveals the true nature of nationalism, 
but rather that the explicit ideological form, the stirring call to die for one's country, is 
rendered more plausible by nationalism's banal presence.  Billig's approach falls 
squarely on the side of ideological as opposed to more cultural analyses.  This darker 
side of Billig's banal nationalism sometimes gets lost. 
  Another important aspect of Billig's argument, particularly relevant here, is that it is 
a critique of the Social Identity Theory associated with the social psychology of Henri 
Tajfel (1974, 1981).  The work of Tajfel and his followers focuses on how our need 
for a positive self-image leads to the investment of personal identities in categorical 
social identities that are positively valued, and contrasted to other negatively valued 
identities.   Without rejecting this idea, Billig objects that it fails to grasp how the 
social category of national identity is actually constituted, and why it persists.  Basic 
to Billig's argument is that such identities are not cognitive schemata, but rather 
patterns of practice and habit built into the material and social environment.  We don't 
just adopt such social categories because they fill certain psychological needs, we 
adapt to a social environment that renders these categories 'real' and imperative (cf. 
Eagleton 1991:40).  
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  With this précis of banal nationalism in mind, let me consider its applicability to our 
case of BoS and its merger.  In the first place, as one of the major Scottish banks, 
founded in Scotland and serving primarily a Scottish customer base (at least in regard 
to personal banking), BoS routinely but quietly 'flags up' Scottishness by its very 
nature.  From the tartan ties and skirts of customer-facing staff, to the regular 
sponsorship of quintessentially Scottish activities and events such as the Tatoo, the 
martial pipe band display that takes place annually as part of the Edinburgh Festival, 
BoS as an institution has helped to affirm a taken-for-granted Scottishness.  
  A particularly vivid episode of symbolic affirmation of BoS’s Scotishness was on 
display in the Bank’s tercentenary celebrations that ran throughout the year in 1995, 
and were a major event in the life of the Bank throughout Scotland.  Numerous gifts 
and celebrations were commissioned by the Bank to mark the event.  All staff persons 
were encouraged to attend celebratory dinners put on by the Bank on Burns Night (the 
annual national celebration in Scotland of the life of the poet Robert Burns) and the 
founding date of the Bank (there was a collective toast at the end of that working 
day).   Other celebrations and commissions included: commemorative bank notes 
(Scottish banks each produce their own bank notes); a new tartan for the staff 
uniform; two bank histories, one more ‘popular’ (Cameron 1995), the other scholarly 
(Saville 1996); a triptych tapestry representing the Bank’s history; a competition for 
composing an original tune for bagpipes; and hundreds of charitable donations in the 
areas education, the environment, homelessness, the arts and sports.  The Queen and 
the Duke of Edinburgh made a special visit to the Bank’s headquarters in Edinburgh 
to acknowledge the occasion, and the Governor of the Bank, took the ‘salute’ of the 
massed military pipe bands at the final Tattoo of the summer of 1995.  
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  In addition to being a vessel for such overt symbolisation, BoS also serves as an 
object of discourse that is viewed as embodying aspects of Scottish identity.  One of 
my findings, when asking staff to compare the organisational cultures of the two 
banks and speculate on what the 'culture' of HBOS would be like, was that many staff, 
from both BoS and Halifax, saw BoS as expressing Scottish norms and values.  As a 
woman working in BoS's corporate division put it:  
 
Paternalistic, professional, conservative, cautious, parochial, epitomising a 
‘canny Scots’ culture, presbyterian, inclusive, friendly environment to work 
in. Becoming less hierarchical and having to ‘move with the times’, more 
openiii. 
 
  A fellow I worked with in the HR division of BoS, soon to retire, responded: 
 
Prior to the merger (having worked for the Bank for 30 years and allowing for 
a biased opinion) the Bank had a strong culture of a type of 
Presbyterian Scots values, possibly dour Bankers that had a good grasp of 
their market, small enough to have short lines of communication--but 
innovative enough to create solid year on year organic growth. 
Is it changing?   Yes it has changed with the decision to protect the 
Brand by amalgamating with Halifaxiv 
 
 
  In statements like these (both made by Scots), there is more going on than simply 
Scottishness being quietly affirmed in the background.  The idea of Scottishness is 
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being used to help understand the organisation and its adaptability to the new 
situation.  The discourse of Scottishness, while relatively apolitical and 'banal', is 
explicit. 
  There have been times however, when the banal nationalism of BoS has tipped over 
into something more political, a bit 'hotter'.  For instance, in 1995 major institutional 
investor Standard Life announced its plans to sell off its 32.2% share in BoS, which 
sparked speculations in the financial press that this could make BoS vulnerable to take 
over if acquired en bloc.  This led to various political figures in Scotland speaking out 
in the press about the need to keep BoS 'independent' as a key asset of Scottish 
society, a notion met with some derision by commentators who preferred the 
workings of the market to national interests.  Latter in 1999 when BoS made a 
surprise bid to take over NatWest Bankv, the two leading executives of BoS at the 
time were represented in newspaper texts and cartoons as marauding Jacobites 
coming over the border, and the Financial Times called it a 'Braveheart Raid on 
Dowdy Dame with Tarnished Past' (25 September 1999).  However, many 
commentators were now quick to point out that under these new and more aggressive 
terms, BoS and other Scottish Banks could not expect to have their 'independence' 
protected, as it had been in the past.  What episodes like these illustrate is that even 
the relatively banal institutions of banking provide, at certain junctures, a context in 
which a more explicit discourse of national autonomy gets articulated. 
  How does all this fit with Billig's notion of banal nationalism? There is a continuum 
of manifestations, from subliminal 'unflagged' forms to highly conscious 
mobilisations of Scottishness.  Part of why this kind of material seems to fall under 
the rubric of banal nationalism is not so much its implicit as opposed to explicit 
character, but rather its relatively apolitical character most of the time.  Nationalism 
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appears 'banal' when it is articulated outside the sphere of the formal politics of 
interest groups, parties, and the state.  Furthermore, it would be wrong to suggest 'the 
nation' is an ideological frame that is somehow imposed on BoS, in the same sense 
that Billig talks about weather reports being framed from an implicitly national 
perspective.  BoS is, or at least was before the merger, Scottish, in the sense that its 
origins, history and interests have been bound up with that of a broader Scottish 
society (Saville 1996).  It is not a thing apart, like the weather or the landscape, 
assimilated by a nationalist gaze, it is one of the institutions through which Scottish 
society has developed. The frame, and what is being 'framed', are not as easily 
distinguished here as Billig's model of 'ideological habituation' seems to suggest.  
Moreover, while one can argue that BoS provides a banal context for reinforcing 
belief in a Scottish identity, the normal flow of Billig's argument, one can equally 
argue that Scottish identity provides a resource for reinforcing staff commitment to 
the bank.  Suffice it to say that the staff of BoS worked in an organisational 
environment that, by its very nature, was extensively furnished with routine, banal 
invocations of the social category of Scottish identity. 
 
Personal Nationalism 
 
  The anthropologist Anthony P. Cohen has put forward the concept of 'personal 
nationalism' in grappling with our guiding question: 
 
The "nation" is a grand generalization that does not discriminate among, and 
says nothing specific about, its individual members.  By contrast the 
individual is highly specific and is distinguished from other individuals in 
 11
innumerable and very particular ways.  Why, then, do individuals elect to 
identify themselves (to themselves as well as to others) in terms of the nation? 
(1996:802). 
 
  Cohen's attempt to answer to this question arises out of his more general critique of 
the tendency in anthropology and the social sciences to disregard questions of 
personal identity and self consciousness, or reduce these to manifestations of social 
structure (Cohen 1994).  He argues the intractable nature of individual reality, and 
doubts standard ethnographic accounts in which powerful symbols and public rituals 
of nationhood are thought to draft individual minds into conformity with the larger 
social category (ibid.:156-67).  Instead,  
 
We watch these rites and, as individuals, in interpreting them we remake them 
in the sense that we are able to make of them.  In just the same way we listen 
to our leaders' vacuous rhetoric and render it meaningful by attributing our 
own sense to it, so that the sense we hear in the words being uttered is ours, 
not theirs.  We hear their voices but listen to ourselves.  This is what I mean 
by "personal nationalism" (1996:807, italics in original).vi 
 
  Responding to the charge that this unhelpfully renders national identity as all things 
to all people, Cohen concedes that there must be some 'objective correlative'--the 
myriad of individual national identities must correspond to something 'out there' 
(2000:150).  His answer is twofold.  First, national populations are heterogeneous, and 
will only converge on a common understanding of their material interests in the 
nation under exceptional circumstances.  But where national identity is a routine 
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aspect of everyday life (as it is in Scotland, the primary focus of Cohen's research), 
Cohen suggests that there is a common interest in having a national identity as such, 
precisely, and somewhat paradoxically, because it provides a shared ground for 
articulating personal identities (ibid.:161).  Secondly, he proposes that all human 
knowledge is personal and perspectival--whether of material objects or social 
constructs--so the problem of building up a collective view of objects out of our 
personal 'peripheral' perspectives is a general one, not peculiar to nationalism.  
Moreover, he suggests that as a putative 'dogmatic centre', the hypostatised nation, 
provides a ground through and against which peripheral individuals can define 
themselves (ibid.:163-7).  Again, far from subsuming individuals, it affords them one 
means by which to be individuals. 
  Cohen's formulations here are rather tentative and not entirely satisfactory.  
Although there may be a basic human need for collective identities, the nagging 
question really is: why should it be national identity that serves this need in some 
cases?   And many would want to argue (myself included) that personal national 
identities normally correspond to something more substantial than a social and 
cognitive need to posit the shared object.  There are real historical patterns of social 
organisation, of dispositions of powers, which make such identities compelling. 
Finally, Cohen emphasises the uniqueness and incommensurability of individual 
experiences, but many of us are as interested in their comparability, and would not see 
attention to this as undermining the authorial self, but simply as a matter of finding 
connections.  Nonetheless, Cohen helpfully prods our thinking about the complexities 
of the problem of personal and social identities in regard to nationalism.  His 
approach here ultimately develops a key theme from his earlier work (1985), which 
drew on the symbolic analysis of the anthropologist Victor Turner (1967:19-47), who 
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stressed that symbols, especially in ritual contexts, are 'multivocalic', achieving social 
integration precisely by appearing to unify divergent interpretations.  Cohen attempts 
to refine and transpose this model of explanation to the question of how persons relate 
to nationalisms as social identities. 
  I turn again to the bank study to examine Cohen's ideas.  I encountered many 
situations in which invocations of national identity seemed to be more a way of 
framing personal feelings and biographies, than subscribing to collective identities.  
As a mid-career Scottish woman in business banking remarked in regard to the 
tercentenary celebration described above:  
 
One thing that I grew to admire whilst working for BoS was its sense of 
history and what BoS has given to the Scottish community over the past 300 
years. Particularly being in Edinburgh for the Tercentenary celebrations was 
an exceptionally proud experience for me. I’m now in London [but still 
working for HBOS] and as this has a sense of an “ex-pat” working 
environment, I think the traditional culture [of the bank] has gone and there is 
a sense of starting from scratch again (insertions added for clarification).vii 
 
  Note two things here.  First, the way a sense of personal pride is simultaneously 
stirred by an understanding of the social role of BoS in Scotland, and by being 
Scottish.  The former gives substance to the latter, and is not clearly distinct from it.  
Secondly, this sense of Scottishness-in-the-bank is invoked as a point of contrast with 
the uncertainty and unease of the person's present situation.  Scottishness in this 
instance gets its significance as a sign of personal loss.  An individual career 
trajectory is characterised against a shift from the presence to the relative absence of 
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Scottishness.  And this experience gets linked to a more general shift in organisational 
culture, with its corresponding diminution of Scottishness, which was being 
experienced and expressed to me by staff throughout the bank.  The crucial point here 
is that being Scottish is not simply a matter of self-categorisation, it is a medium for 
making sense of personal circumstances. 
  Another prominent theme from my research was the tendency of some English 
people to perceive and stereotype Scots as parochial and insular in their outlook on 
the world.  This more general discursive trope in the UK was, in this context, tending 
to get mapped onto the relationship between the two merging banks, such that the 
Halifax was often portrayed as youthful, progressive, and 'thrusting', and BoS as 
conservative and somewhat backward.  My Scottish informants sometimes expressed 
resentment at this perception of Scots, but also often accepted it in certain respects, 
pointing to it as something they disliked about being Scottish.   A senior project 
manager in business banking, a woman who came to BoS as a graduate trainee in the 
1990s, linked these two points in an interview: 
 
Some of the things I don’t like about being Scottish are … two things really 
that spring to mind.  You can sometimes be treated as though … you’re from 
Scotland, you can’t possibly be cosmopolitan or worldly wise or cool or 
whatever because you come from a very small town in Scotland.  What could 
you possibly understand about the world in general compared to somebody 
from London for example?  They must be much more accustomed to eating 
sushi than you are or something like that.  Silly little things like that, the 
assumption that because you’re from somewhere relatively small and you’ve 
lived most of your life in Scotland, you can’t possibly know about all these 
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types of things.  The other thing that I don’t like is the … probably this is 
partly what earns us the reputation but the sort of parochial, inward looking 
stuff that does go on.  I can be just as frustrated by some of my countrymen as 
anybody else in the wider world.  They can be too insular and probably not 
exposed enough to other influences, whether they be cultural influences or 
whatever… 
 
  A bit later in the same interview she sketched a familiar scenario, echoed in many of 
my interviews and discussions with Scottish informants: 
 
Yeah.  I mentioned, for example, going to south of France for my holidays this 
year.  I’ve done that several times before and because you’re speaking English 
there’s … the original assumption is that therefore you are English and 
although that’s a peculiarity to the French in this respect but they can be a bit 
cold when they think you’re English, but as soon as I inform them that 
actually, no, in an emphatic manner, that I’m Scottish, there’s quite a 
transformation in their attitude towards you.  I think generally people have 
been really, really interested when they’ve discovered I’m Scottish, whether 
that was in Florida or in Greece.  They wanted to know when we were going 
to becoming independent and things like that.  There’s always a really positive 
reaction when they found out where you’re from, which, given that it’s a 
relatively small place in the whole world, its always somewhat surprising to 
me. 
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  On one hand, these words show someone wrestling with the confines of a negatively 
stereotyped categorical identity, and through that contention both distancing herself 
from the categorical identity and re-appropriating it at the same time, eventually 
arriving at more positive rendition.  The Scot as welcomed world traveller is, again, 
an established discursive trope in Scotland, and a sly inversion of the accusation of 
Scottish parochialism--the Scots are revealed as outward looking and 'getting on well' 
with other nations, unlike the stereotype of the insular English abroad.  On the other 
hand, while generalisations about the Scots and the English are what is being 
mobilised here, it is the self that is being positioned.  She is talking about what kind of 
person she is and how people respond to her, and trying to deal with how Scottishness 
and Englishness bear upon that.   
  Cohen's argument often seems to suggest an utter collapsing of the social category of 
national identity into personal identity, such that the two become indistinguishable.  
This does not usefully describe most articulations of Scottish national identity that I 
have encountered.  However, as in the fragments above, using the social category of 
the nation to help situate the self and interpret personal circumstances is something I 
recognise.  Given that people often find themselves cast into a world where national 
categories are pressed upon them as means of knowing and evaluating others, it is not 
surprising that people find ways to appropriate these for self-making.  Despite some 
haziness in Cohen's formulation of 'personal nationalism', people do in fact 
personalise national identity, and this gives the concept some analytic force.  
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Embedded Nationalism 
 
  Billig and Cohen are sometimes viewed as having basically similar concerns (e.g. 
McCrone 2001:153).  However, Billig's concept of 'banal nationalism' belongs in the 
family of conceptions of ideology.  It offers an account of how the social category is 
ideologically sustained outwith the domain of active consciousness.  Cohen's 'personal 
nationalism', by contrast, is precisely concerned with how nation-ness enters into the 
constitution of personal consciousness.   Despite corresponding attempts to rethink 
nationalism and national identity beyond the bounds of explicit ideology and more in 
terms of everyday experience, their projects are in fact quite distinct, because Billig is 
really concerned with nationalism as a social identity, while Cohen is concerned with 
it as personal identity.  They address two different sides of the questions we began 
with. 
  To comprehend the relationship between the personal and social dimensions of 
national identity we need basic conceptual tools for thinking about why people forge 
these linkages, and how specific social contexts mediate the use of nation-ness as a 
basis for identity.  Beyond its general availability as an ideological resource (Billig), 
and its highly personal significance (Cohen), there lie questions about the 
contextualised motivations for drawing on that resource.  So I will now develop a 
third formulation, 'embedded nationalism', which seeks to bridge this gap.  As I have 
said, our question is a particular version of the more general problem of the 
relationship between personal and social identity, so I begin with some ideas about 
that general problem advanced by Derek Layder, before returning to the subject of 
nationalism.  In the second edition of his book Understanding Social Theory (2006) 
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Layder has tried to spell out his conceptual model for studying personal identity and 
its relationship to the social world (see also: Layder 2004a, 2004b).     
  Layder's approach emphasises the significance of power for personal identity and 
emotional well-being.  In short he argues that human beings have a fundamental need 
to control uncertainty and unpredictability in their social environment, that emotions 
are a key medium by which this is achieved, and that the result of adequate 
negotiations of control is a stable and well adjusted sense of self and identity.  Thus 
people are continually involved in power, in the positive sense of empowerment, 
through acts of personal mastery and ‘benign control’, Layder's term for mutually 
negotiated relations of power that meet the needs of all persons involved and keep 
self-interested manipulations of others to a minimum. For Layder a modicum of 
'benign' power is at the heart of our emotional and psychological health.  But this 
process is of course fraught.  As we know, loss of a sense of control over one's life 
can induce depression and lead to a condition where a viable self identity is 
threatened, and fundamental failures in the childhood development of a stable sense 
of self through benign control can lead to extreme forms of psychopathology.   None 
of this is meant to deny either that people also engage in manipulative and 
exploitative interpersonal power relations, or the multiple and more structural and 
impersonal forms of power, in the senses of domination, coercion and force, that 
usually monopolise the attention of social scientists (Jenkins 1994; Lukes 2005; 
Wrong 2002).  It merely seeks to bring back in a crucial dimension of how social 
power works that is often neglected.   
  Layder situates this notion of the power-seeking self within an abstracted model of 
embedded layers, or 'domains', of social interaction (see Layder 2004b:49)viii.  He 
conceptualises the self as a core of personal identity, with its own distinct history of 
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negotiated control over its environment (which he calls ‘psychobiography’).  The first 
layer of the self’s immediate episodic interactions with others he labels ‘situated 
activity’.  The next layer out includes the more enduring patterns of on-going social 
relations found in institutions and organisations of all types, which he calls ‘social 
settings’.   Finally there is a layer he labels ‘contextual resources’ which refers to the 
encompassing environment of socially created material and ideational artefacts that 
both structure and can be drawn upon in social interactions.  The distinctions are 
analytic--any instance of social interaction occurs across all domains at once.  This 
schema of course simplifies and misrepresents with its spatial metaphor of a core with 
covering layers, but Layder is clear that its purpose is heuristic, not flatly descriptive.  
My point is that some conceptual apparatus like this, addressing the embeddedix 
nature of personhood, is needed to talk more specifically, and ultimately 
comparatively, about how individuals draw down the cultural resources of social 
(national) identities and incorporate them into their own self-understandings. Let me 
return to the bank merger one last time in order to do that. 
  I have already shown that (Scottish) national identity is, in Layder's terms, a basic 
'contextual resource', available to be drawn upon in numerous banal and not so banal 
ways.  And I have suggested that this sometimes gets done in the management of 
unique personal identity.  The interviewee who recounted how her French hosts 
warmed to her on her holidays once she made clear she was Scottish, not English, is a 
good example of Layder's 'situated activity' in which identities are negotiated.  But 
from here on I will be more concerned with the 'layer' that Layder calls 'social 
settings', and in particular the bank as an institution and organisation in and through 
which people sought livelihoods, careers, and even identities to a degree.  
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  BoS was known for an exceptional level of staff loyalty, a point frequently made to 
me by bank staff.  This loyalty was fostered in many ways.  As we saw in regard to 
the Tercentenary Celebrations, the bank took an active role in cultivating a corporate 
identity for the bank and its staff, but such symbolic performances are only part of the 
picture.  The bank had a reputation for providing staff with a 'job for life' and an 
unofficial 'no redundancy' policy whereby under-performing staff would normally be 
relocated to more appropriate jobs within the bank rather than let go.  Moreover, for 
many of my informants BoS had been their only significant employer in their adult 
lives; having started at the bank straight from school at seventeen was not unusual.  
Historically most senior staff worked their way up through the organisation, from a 
branch to the head office, over many years.  In addition, bank staff routinely sought 
their professional banking qualifications while working for the bank, and saw this as 
an important mark of achievement and professional status.  In more than one 
conversation with BoS staff this was explicitly made as a point of contrast with the 
Halifax staff, who were not 'real bankers', but simply 'sellers of mortgages.' 
  Over the last twenty-five years increased differentiation and specialisation within the 
bank, and growing graduate recruitment had eroded, to a degree, the classic pattern of 
the staff person who works their way up from the bottom, getting familiar with many 
or most areas of the bank along their way.  But during my research the merger was 
widely seen as effecting a fundamental shift, marking the end of the older ethos of 
life-long service, with increasing trends toward appointing new staff in promoted and 
executive positions from outside the bank, and perhaps even outside the banking 
profession, and younger staff in the graduate training scheme having no assumptions 
about staying with the bank throughout their careers. 
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  Given these changes, it is not surprising that I often encountered a local discourse 
among BoS staff members evoking a 'loss of community'.  When asking about the 
changing culture of the organisation I frequently encountered metaphors of 'family' to 
convey how things were, and what was being lost: 
 
The Bank used to be one big happy family and you sort of knew most people.  
You could look at the appointments circular and see how people were 
progressing and moving on.  We no longer have this communication.x  
 
Always seemed like a family to me.  Looking back, paternalistic seems to be 
the defining word--you know the kind of thing--keen for you to do well, but 
willing to forgive when you don't.  As with parents the culture sometimes 
seemed overbearing and a little conservative. xi 
 
  The first quote comes from a young Scottish woman working in staff development 
who had joined BoS in the late 1990s, the second from a man raised in Scotland, 
employed by BoS for about 20 years, and based in corporate banking in England.  As 
his quote suggests, it was routinely acknowledged that this 'familialism' was bound up 
with a 'paternalism' that could be both protective and stifling.  Along with the sense of 
loss, I also encountered a mood of relief among some staff, and sense that a rather 
closed and insular system, was being forced open.  And, as with the rest of the 
banking profession, paternalism was linked to patriarchal patterns in which women 
had great difficulty advancing much beyond the middle grades of the organisation.  
But my present purpose is to highlight how these characterisations of BoS map onto 
more general characterisations of Scotland and Scottishness, such that the 
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organisation seemed at times to be the very embodiment of Scottishness.  This kind of 
familial and communal language was used not just to characterise relations within the 
bank, but also to describe the 'fit' between BoS and the broader Scottish community, 
as one of the nation's core institutions, with an important influence, from local town 
life to the wider world.  As one Scottish woman, a senior figure in 'organisational 
learning' commented somewhat nostalgically: 
 
I saw Bank of Scotland as being a traditional organisation, steeped in its 
roots in Scotland but, like Scots themselves, with branches of the family 
all over the world.  I saw an organisation that was "Presbyterian" in its 
values, respecting views and recognising loyalty.  However, as with the 
innovative nature of many "great Scots" I saw an organisation that "had a 
go" and did things differently if the time was right.  ...   It was an organisation 
that was an integral part of the community--teacher, minister, doctor and Bank 
Manager were key, and BoS played a very strong role in securing the lead 
manager role in many communities.  This was not a loyalty that was bought 
but a respect that was earned.xii  
 
  A mid-career Scottish man in corporate banking put it perhaps more bluntly: 
 
The organizational culture of the Bank I believe is partly a factor of the 
nature of the Scottish people.  It contains characteristics typically associated 
with that such as a sense of history, conservatism, loyalty, prudence and self-
deprecating humour!xiii  
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  These combined characterisations of Scots in general, and BoS, were not simply 
self-congratulatory.  In the context of the merger they contained an undertow of 
anxiety, defensiveness, and self-criticism, because many of these Scottish 'traits' 
were also seen as potential liabilities in the new organisation that appeared to 
favour assertiveness and the ability to sell over prudence and loyalty.  When asking 
people what significant differences they saw between the Scots and the English, 
the theme of 'confidence' that was repeatedly used to draw a distinction. This issue 
of confidence, and a peculiarly Scottish problem in this regard, came up in several 
of the general staff training courses I participated in with names such as 
“Assertiveness” and “Influencing and Persuading”.  Core staff in management 
development and staff training saw this ‘Scottish trait’ as having consequences for 
their work.  As one professional trainer, a Scottish woman recently returned to 
Scotland from England said when I asked ‘does being in Scotland make the job 
different?’ 
 
Yes.  The people on the courses are more quiet, diffident, don’t want to work 
or speak out in big groups--prefer to work in pairs.  This is not so true at the 
senior level, but very true at the lower levels.  They need encouragement to 
focus on what they’re good at.  Down south when one worked on giving and 
receiving feedback, it came more easily to them.  The English are generally 
easier to work with in training [paraphrased quote from field notes]. 
  
  The interviewee who wrestled with the image of Scottish parochialism in the 
previous section described the differences between the Scots and the English in terms 
representative of those I encountered throughout fieldwork: 
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In many ways there is no difference at all, both nationalities are subject 
to pretty much the same living environment and surroundings, subject to the 
same influences so unlikely to be radically different.  However, Scots have 
a tendency towards playing and relishing the part of the underdog and 
generally under selling themselves and perpetuating the notion of being put 
upon by the English.  English never seem to undersell themselves, more 
likely the opposite, displaying levels of confidence that seem over the top 
to many Scots. I think that is the main difference, the degree of confidence 
displayed.xiv  
 
  While this kind comparison of the Scots and the English could probably have been 
elicited at any time during the recent history of the bank, at the time of the merger it 
clearly had a specific salience, an extra 'bite', because it carried implications for the 
respective fates of the confident and the diffident, who were easily if inaccurately 
equated with the English and the Scottish, and the staffs of Halifax and BoS.  These 
comparisons functioned not simply as characterisations, but as partial explanations for 
the uncertainty and loss of control that BoS staff were experiencing in regard to their 
lives and careers.  
  What Layder's model helps us conceptualise more clearly is the way that personal 
and social dimensions of national identity are mediated by concrete and ongoing 
social settings through which power relations get negotiated.  The salience of 
symbolic resources, in this case national identities, depends on how they appear to 
illuminate struggles for control over one's more immediate social environment.  In 
this particular case the Scottishness, both of BoS as an organisation, and of most of its 
 25
staff, was being used to help articulate a narrative of anxiety and discomfort in regard 
the experience of merger.  The context-bound utility of these ideas of national identity 
for people talking about and making sense of their circumstances is as important for 
understanding how national identity works, as its implicit encoding in the social 
environment, or its capacity to provide an epistemic ground for personal identity.  The 
social conflicts revealed in this case are relatively subdued and routine, but the same 
principles are at work when national identities are invoked in much more intensive 
and volatile conflicts.  Either way, the language of national identity is engaged by 
persons seeking more control over their social environment, in particular 
organisational and institutional contexts. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  Properly understood, our guiding question is a local variant of much larger 
theoretical debates about the relationships between macro and micro processes, and 
structure and agency (Barnes 2001; Layder 2006). This is why I have turned from 
Billig's and Cohen's nationalism-specific formulations to Layder's more general 
conceptualisation of the problem.  Within this frame I am particularly concerned with 
how we understand personhood, and how its relationship to pervasive social and 
cultural structures is mediated by the more specific organisational contexts through 
which people realise their needs, wants, and aspirations.  Regarding personhood I 
share Layder's conviction that social theory must take account of the reality of 
individuality, because an overly social constructionist notion of self and identity (e.g. 
Althusser 2000; Butler 1990; Rose 1996) 'obliterates individual characteristics and 
unique subjective responses, producing a defective understanding of the relationship 
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between the individual and society' (2006:274).  I also agree with Dennis Wrong who 
argues that inherent tensions between individuals and their sphere of social relations 
are part of what generates social order in the first place, and thus notions of the human 
psyche cannot be dispensed with in well-rounded social theory (1996).  Regarding 
organisational contexts, I would again endorse Layder's view that personhood 
fundamentally requires a degree of stable power over the self, and that this possibility 
is always conditioned by the multiple organisational contexts in which the self is 
situated (2004b).  Thus the way persons become invested in social identities depends 
on how the intermediate organisational contexts through which they succeed or fail to 
empower themselves articulate with those identity categories.  This view is at odds 
with, for instance, Richard Jenkins, who when discussing power in relation to social 
identities, emphasises how organisations and dominant groups wield power through 
social categorisation, using social identities to legitimise the allocation of resources 
and penalties (see 1994; 2004:160-75).  I agree of course that this happens, but this 
perspective has a 'top down' skew to it, failing to appreciate they way people also 
actively draw on these social identities in their personal searches for power over their 
own lives (or, as in this study, to help account for the vicissitudes of such power). 
  Returning to the substance of this article, I have tried to illustrate the way national 
identity can suffuse certain social settings, becoming situationally relevant not just in 
the episodic interactions of individuals, but in the larger and more binding fates of 
organisations in which people become invested.  National identity does not exist in 
two polar forms--one inscribed on the inner self, the other suspended in the discursive 
ether.  Rather, it gets reproduced along a series of relations, as individuals reach out 
through the various forms of social organisation that frame their particular lives and 
circumstances, to draw on the larger cognitive category in ways that make it 
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personally relevant.  For the people encountered in this study the bank is only one of 
many settings in which this happens, and probably not the most important one.  
Networks of social relations based on family and kinship, co-residence, voluntary 
associations and leisure activities are likely to be just as if not more important in the 
practical, everyday instantiation of Scottishnessxv.  But by looking at the role of 
national identity in this one dimension, of people's working lives, we can explore the 
process in some detail, and then infer that some variation on this same process is also 
going on in the other dimensions of people's lives, thus reinforcing the identity 
category on several fronts. Part of grasping the ubiquity and tenacity of national 
identity, and how people are attached to such identities, lies in appreciating that it is 
not something sustained by a few key carriers--state discourse, political ideologues, 
the media--that can be knocked off their perches with the right argument.  It's more 
like Velcro.  Not one big hook and eye, but a multitude of small ones, tiny, daily 
points of attachment that together can bind very tightly. 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
i HBOS staff members were always informed of my role as an academic researcher. 
ii For more information on this programme, see: http://www.institute-of-
governance.org/forum/Leverhulme/TOC.html. 
iii  Questionnaire response [063]. 
iv Questionnaire response [182]. 
v  BoS ultimately failed to take over Nat West because it was outbid by its major 
Scottish competitor, the Royal Bank of Scotland.  This made it a competitive 
imperative that BoS find an alternative, which it did in its merger with Halifax. 
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vi Richard Haesly (2005) has recently tried to operationalise Cohen's idea of personal 
nationalism using survey methods that allow respondents to rank responses to a large 
list of statements about national identity, thus yielding a much more fine-grained 
array of sub-types among those claiming the national identity in question.  While this 
is an interesting and useful methodological approach, I do not think it really addresses 
the substance of Cohen's inquiry, which is not simply to disaggregate the social 
category, but rather to account for its significance for individual persons. 
vii Questionnaire response [108]. 
viii Jenkins posits three interdependent dimensions of social analysis: the individual 
order, the interaction order, and the institutional order (2004:17-23).  But these are 
conceptualised as domains of inquiry, not as embedded levels in the conception of the 
self. 
ix  I would underscore that I have used 'embedded' here to characterise the nature of 
personhood, working off Layder's model.  The term generally gets used in the social 
sciences to loosely emphasise that some phenomenon is deeply rooted in its social 
context.  Thus one might describe Billig's banal nationalism thesis as one that treats 
identity as something that is 'embedded' in the social environment in unnoticed ways, 
but that would be a very different use of the term from mine.  The most elaborated 
and influential uses of the term have occurred in economic sociology (see Zukin and 
DiMaggio 1990; Kripner 2001).  There it has normally been used to describe either 
the way economic institutions can be embedded in other institutions (e.g. kinship, 
religion) after the fashion of Karl Polanyi (1971), or the way economic behaviour is 
embedded in social networks (Granovetter 1985), cognitive frameworks (Callon 
1998), and normative structures (Zelizer 1988).  My point is simply that it matters 
what one is describing as 'embedded.'  These more prominent uses of the term in 
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economic sociology are relatively unconcerned with the nature of persons and their 
identities per se, and thus conceptually quite distant from the argument I am 
developing here. 
x Questionnaire response [157]. 
xi Questionnaire response [135]. 
xii Questionnaire response [020]. 
xiii Questionnaire response [030]. 
xiv Questionnaire response [076]. 
xv And of course the personal appropriation of other social identities (gender, class, 
etc.) usually works in the same manner, mediated though a range of organisational 
contexts in which the social category becomes salient for self-realisation. 
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